U.S. Retreats from First Island Chain, Exposing Taiwan's Cross-Strait Dilemma
The Storm Media Editorial, December 20, 2024
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) recent military activities was described by national security officials as a "silent exercise," with the Ministry of National Defense noting its impressive naval strength and its positioning between the first and second island chains. However, the true nature of this exercise remains unclear. The concept of the Pacific "island chain" still deeply influences the ruling party.
During a stopover in Guam on December 5 during his tour of diplomatic allies, President Lai Ching-te "moved" Guam to the vicinity of Taiwan. President Lai claimed that Taiwan and Guam, both located in the first island chain, must closely unite to face the threat of authoritarianism. This highlights the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) strong belief in Taiwan's strategic position within the first island chain, viewing Taiwan as a member of the American-led effort to contain China. Taiwan’s security strategy has heavily relied on this military defense line to counter the mainland.
However, this defense line is showing signs of weakness. According to Japanese media, the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa has begun relocating to Guam and Hawaii, with about 9,000 personnel being reassigned. This relocation is a significant warning for Taiwan, symbolizing American "strategic retreat" in the Indo-Pacific region, signaling the weakening deterrence of the first island chain and a shift in the balance of military power between China and the United States.
Several key military indicators point to this shift. First, China has entered the "three-carrier era," with one carrier in port for maintenance, another training in the South China Sea, and a third regularly deployed on the outer edge of the first island chain. The original plan of the United States to arm the first island chain as a "forward base" to create an interwoven firepower network has been undermined by China's growing naval strength. Additionally, China’s launch of the Dongfeng-31AG ICBM in late September, with a range of 11,700 kilometers, can now reach Hawaii in the third island chain. On October 17, Chinese President Xi Jinping inspected the Rocket Force, showcasing the Dongfeng-26 missile, with a range covering Guam in the second island chain.
These developments indicate that the first island chain, once a frontline of American military projection, is now facing fractures. Northeast Asia's geopolitical situation is also evolving. South Korea’s U.S.-friendly government is on the brink of collapse due to a recent martial law crisis, while Japan led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba avoids explicitly stating that the a crisis in the Taiwan Strait is equivalent to a crisis for Japan. With U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's impending return to the White House, President Joe Biden's efforts to build a democratic alliance in Northeast Asia are nearing collapse, which could disrupt U.S.-Japan-Korea security cooperation.
American retreat from the first island chain reflects a broader contraction of U.S. global strategy. With the subtle shifts in Japan and South Korea’s governments, and the uncertainty surrounding Mr. Trump’s policies toward Taiwan, this development is a major warning for the Lai administration.
The Lai administration’s increasingly hardline cross-strait stance is based on its belief in the first island chain as a "psychological defense." Yet even think tanks in Washington have lost confidence. A 2023 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicated that even with American and Japanese military intervention, Taiwan would only achieve a "Pyrrhic victory." The latest war game report by CSIS also included nuclear weapons, showing that the situation for Taiwan is worsening, and in the event of conflict, Taiwan would pay a heavy price.
The strategic position of the first island chain has altered with the relocation of American troops from Okinawa; it reveals a truth that the Lai administration cannot openly discuss in Taiwanese society. The development indirectly demonstrates that President Lai's comments about the first island chain on May 20 have fallen apart. In this light, how much leverage does Taiwan still possess in pursuing a hostile-to-the-end and confrontational policy towards mainland China? Domestic cognitive tactics alleging the "world's strongest tanks" or "largest military exercises" cannot hide the fact that Taiwan's anti-China strategy is facing a serious dilemma.